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1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of electricity in the lives of 21
st
 century people cannot be stressed 
enough. For a traditional homeowner almost every mundane task, from space heating 
to tooth brushing involves at least some levels of electricity usage. Despite the 
importance of electricity, the details of electricity contracts and the market system 
are relatively overlooked matters in people’s daily lives. According to a recent study 
done by Nordic energy regulators (2019), approximately one third of the Finnish 
electricity customers do not know how much their annual electricity consumption is. 
The study also revealed that only sixty percent of the households know the 
company’s name that handles distribution of electricity into their homes. This 
indicates that for a lot of people the knowledge that electricity comes from the 
socket, whenever it is needed seems to be enough.  
However, when looked at a system level, having electricity available whenever it is 
needed is not so simple. It requires a vast network of operators and collaboration of 
multiple different parties. Electricity markets nearly everywhere in the world are 
constrained by the fundamental problem. The demand side is difficult to forecast and 
almost completely insensitive to price fluctuations, while the supply side faces 
limiting constraints at peak times, and storing the electricity is prohibitively costly. 
(Borenstein, 2002.) Another characteristic feature of the electricity markets is that the 
supply and demand of the electricity needs to be constantly at equilibrium state. 
Otherwise the system will face problems, which makes it vulnerable to service 
failures, such as blackouts. The supply and demand sides are connected to each other 
via transmission and distribution networks. Constructing these networks include high 
amounts of sunk costs, hence there are typically no competitive distribution networks 
around any residential areas. Due to high sunk costs, transmission and distribution 
companies  operate in natural monopoly market, making the distribution of 
electricity governmentally regulated business. These key characteristics have 
traditionally outlined the nature of electricity markets. However, the development of 
technology has enabled to face these fundamental problems with new tools. 
One of the most notable developments of technology include the introduction of 
smart meters that enable accurate and up to date monitoring of electricity 
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consumption. This development has enabled electricity retailers to include 
economically correct price signals for their customers. This is done by offering 
contracts that include varying prices for electricity for every hour of the day, every 
day of the year. Another current wave of development is the rapid increase of 
renewable but volatile energy generation sources, such as wind power and solar 
power. These generation methods are difficult to predict without uncertainties. When 
these intermittent energy sources gain more share in the overall energy generation 
mix, the power system requires better adjustability to sudden volatilities in supply 
side of the markets. One way for the system to adjust promptly is to have more 
flexibility in the demand side.  
Demand response is a key concept in this thesis. With high probability it has an 
essential role in the power systems of near future. The European Commission (2013) 
defines demand response as: “Voluntary changes by end-consumers of their usual 
electricity use patterns – in response to market signals, such as time-variable 
electricity prices or incentive payments, or following the acceptance of consumers’ 
bids (on their own or through aggregation) to sell in organized energy electricity 
markets their will to change their demand for electricity at a given point of time”. 
Electricity contracts that incentivise demand response, for instance by having hourly 
varying prices, could arguably make residential consumers more active participants 
in the energy markets.  
The aim of this master’s thesis is to study the Finnish homeowners’ preferences for 
dynamic-priced electricity contracts and demand response. This is done by 
conducting three binary logit regressions based on a sample data that consists of 380 
respondents. The data is from a survey that was originally conducted in October 
2016, by a group of researchers from University of Oulu and Finnish Environment 
Institute (SYKE)
1
. The dependent variables of the three regressions provide 
information that enhances our knowledge about the research topic. First regression 
concentrates on studying what factors are common for people who do not know the 
type of their electricity contract. Second regression concentrates on studying what 
                                                 
1
 The data gathering was supported by the Academy of Finland Strategic Research Council project:   
BC-DC (AKA292854). 
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factors are common for people who either have considered or acquired real time 
priced electricity contract. Third regression examines respondent’s willingness to 
acquire electricity contracts that include consumption control during peak demand 
periods.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 work as a background for 
this thesis topic. Chapter 2 explains the fundaments of the Finnish electricity market 
and the working mechanisms of the Nord Pool common market. Chapter 3 presents 
typical electricity contracts in Finland. In this chapter we introduce the decisions that 
every residential electricity consumer in Finland needs to make when they choose 
their electricity contract. Chapter 4 is devoted to explaining the theoretical basis for 
this thesis’ analyses. The analysis will be done according to discrete choice 
framework by applying binary logit (BL) regression model. Chapter 5 introduces the 
data and the dependable and explanatory variables that are used in the empirical part 
of this thesis. The results of the regressions are presented and discussed in chapter 6. 
Conclusions of this thesis will be made in chapter 7.  
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2 FINNISH ELECTRICITY MARKET 
This chapter of the thesis concisely depicts the characteristics of the Finnish 
electricity markets. First subchapter describes the recent history of the Finnish 
electricity market. This covers the deregulation of the market in 1990s that has led to 
the current  market environment, which will also be briefly covered. Chapter 2.2. 
defines the main components that together form the electricity price that is charged 
from the Finnish homeowners. Chapter 2.3. focuses on the Nordic
2
 power market 
operator Nord Pool and its role in the Finnish homeowner’s electricity contracts. The 
chapter introduces the Nordic power market’s day-ahead trading platform, where 
majority of the power trade in Nordic and Baltic countries takes place. It also 
explains the basics of the intraday market, and the mechanism for the formation of 
the aggregate system price for the electricity, and why it is important for the Finnish 
homeowners. Lastly this subchapter covers the reasons why there are different 
electricity prices for different areas inside the Nordic power markets.   
2.1 Brief history and current status of the Finnish electricity market 
In the same year as Finland joined the European Union, Finland also started to 
restructure its domestic electricity market. After the passing of the Electricity Market 
Act in 1995, Finland’s electricity market was gradually opened to competition. Since 
late 1998, all electricity users from companies to private households have been able 
to choose their preferred electricity supplier. This means that for the past two 
decades Finnish households have been able to compete their energy service 
providers. The distribution and transmission services are still done by local 
companies. (MEAE, 2019.) Finland is part of the Nordic power market, that was 
originally formed by Norway in 1995. The full integration between Nordic countries 
was achieved in 2000, when the last country, Denmark joined to the common market 
(Nord Pool, 2019e).
3
  
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that even though it is called “Nordic” power market, Iceland is excluded. 
3
 Sweden joint in 1996, Finland in 1998, Denmark in 2000. 
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The common power market was formed mainly due to efficiency reasons. The large 
mix of production technologies in the member countries arguably improves the 
production efficiency, when market participants can trade between countries 
(Kopsakangas-Savolainen & Svento, 2010).  One example of this obtained efficiency 
is that the common market enables single countries to have deficits or surpluses in 
the generation capacities. For instance, Finland is currently heavily dependent on 
imported energy, especially when the demand peaks during winter months. 
At the end of  2018, the total installed generation capacity in Finland was about 
17 600 MW. However, the total available generation capacity in the peak load 
situation was vastly lower. In winter 2018-2019 it was estimated to be about 11 950 
MW, whereas the years highest hourly load was 14 062 MW. The gap between 
installed generation capacity and available generation capacity is explained through 
variations in the availability of production facilities. For instance, the total capacity 
of wind power at the end of 2018 was around 2000 MW, yet it is likely that the 
generation capacity is never available in full due to unstable weather conditions. In 
fact, the estimated wind power capacity during peak load period in winter is only 120 
MW or 6 percent of the total capacity. (Energy authority, 2019c.)  
Through the common power market, Finland can import electricity to cover the 
deficit and maintain a balance in the country’s internal market. Currently, the total 
importing capacity is around 5200MW. Naturally the market works both ways, 
meaning that Finland can also export energy, as it does on a daily basis. This is one 
example of how the common power market provides efficiency for its members. 
Another example is the fact that Finland imports electricity throughout the year even 
when the domestic capacity would be able to cover the demand. This is simply 
because the electricity is cheaper to procure from abroad than generate within the 
nation’s borders. (Energy authority, 2019c.)  
Even though the common market enables Finland to have deficit in the generation 
capacity, the Finnish government have recently issued permits for two new nuclear 
power plants that are set to generate electricity in the coming years. The generation 
capacity of the two nuclear power plants are 1600 MW for Olkiluoto 3 and 1200 
MW for Pyhäjoki 1. It should be noted though that the manufacturing of these power 
10 
plants tends to be lengthy business in Finland. For instance, Olkiluoto 3 was 
originally set to be commissioned by the end of 2009. The most recent estimations 
are that it will be in operation some time in 2020. Pyhäjoki 1 is also still waiting for a 
construction licence and will miss the original commission year 2024. Current 
estimation is that the commercial operation will begin in 2028 (Fennovoima, 2019). 
The government has also subsidised significantly the investments in production 
capacity of renewable energy sources (RES), most notably wind power plants
4
. 
(Energy authority, 2018b; 2019c.) The delays in the commissions of the new nuclear 
power plants and the fact that overall demand of electricity is projected to stay in 
similar levels means that Finland will remain as import dependent country also in the 
near future. In fact, Finnish energy authority (2019c) states that Finland will be 
dependent on electricity import in peak load situation, even after Olkiluoto 3 will be 
completed.    
2.2 Components of electricity price in Finland 
For the Finnish electricity customer the total price of the product can be divided into 
three components. These components are the price of the energy, cost of distribution 
service and taxes. Similarly, to many deregulated energy markets, Finnish customers 
may have separate contracts for energy and distribution. This is because the retail 
market for electricity is a competitive market, whereas distribution market is handled 
by government regulated local monopolies. Due to high sunk costs, there is no point 
of constructing competing transmission and distribution grids across the nation. 
Therefore, competition in the electricity markets currently excludes network 
services
5
  and from the households’ point of view the distribution price is fixed
6
. 
(Kopsakangas-Savolainen, 2002.) The third component, taxes are included in 
distribution services’ bill. These taxes include strategic stockpile fee, electricity 
excise tax, as well as value added tax. All end users need to pay the same strategic 
                                                 
4
 In 2017, wind power capacity of almost 400MW was commissioned. Also, the grid connected solar 
power capacity was more than doubled during 2017. In late 2018 the capacity was around 120MW.  
5
 Network services consist of two activities, transmission and distribution. In transmission grid, 
electricity is transmitted over high voltage networks, whereas distribution grids transmits power flows 
to the final consumers. 
6
 Even though the price is considered to be fixed, the aggregate transmission price has increased in 
Finland substantially during the last few years. 
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stockpile fee 0.013 c/kWh, whereas electricity excise tax has two categories 
depending on consumer profile.  (Energy authority, 2019c).  
Determining the total price for electricity in Finland is a compilation of many 
moving parts. The three most influential features are: the terms of user’s energy 
contract, transmission charges from the distribution company, and the annual amount 
of electricity usage, i.e. what is the user’s consumption band. When Eurostat 
produces the price comparisons between EU countries’ households, the used 
consumption band is so called medium standard household, which means that the 
annual consumption is between 2500 and 5000 kWh. Even though Finnish 
households have faced drastic increases in the distribution prices, the average price 
of the electricity is still among the cheapest within the European Union. (Eurostat, 
2018.)  
Figure 1 shows the different levels of total electricity prices according to the nature 
of the end-user. The data is from the beginning of July to the end of December 2018.   
 
Figure 1. Price of electricity by type of consumer, c/kWh (OSF, 2019). 
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Figure 1 demonstrates that the price varies drastically according to annual 
consumption and whether the consumer is private household or a commercial 
customer7. Therefore, it is hard to determine specific common percentages about how 
much each components weigh in the total price of the electricity. However, let us 
consider the typical household consumer that has annual consumption of 2500 to 
5000 kWh per year. According to Finnish Energy authority’s national report (2018b), 
the average total electricity price for this type of a consumer was 15.81 c/kWh during 
the period 1.7.-31.12.20178. Figure 2 displays how the shares of each component is 
distributed to form the total price of the electricity. 
 
Figure 2. The distribution of electricity price in Finland (Energy authority, 2018b).  
Figure 2 shows that with these prices and taxes the components have almost equal 
weight in the total price of electricity. The share for the energy costs is the lowest9, 
which is an interesting insight for the purposes of this study. Consumers have little to 
                                                 
7 Finnish government subsidises firms by charging smaller energy taxes on commercial customers 
than normal household customers, therefore the price for companies is vastly lower than the price for 
households.   
8 Prices are based on the Eurostat’s methodology for collecting electricity prices from 2007 onwards. 
Prices are average of the 6 months. 
9 The share for the energy costs increases when the consumption increases. This is because, with 
lower amount of consumption the distribution bill consists of mainly the standard fee. Therefore, 
when the consumption increases the margin of energy costs increases more compared to network 
charges.  
36% 
31% 
33% 
Network charges
Energy costs and supply
margin
Taxes
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say regarding on taxes and distribution costs. Therefore, apart from actually reducing 
the usage of the electricity, energy contract is basically the only factor where 
individual households can have an effect on the total price of the electricity. Nordic 
energy regulators (2019) recently published a research which stated that among 
customers that had signed new contracts in the past three years the main motivation 
on signing new contracts was to save money. Similar results have been reached in 
academic studies as well (see e.g. Annala, Viljainen, Tuunanen & Honkapuro, 2014). 
However, as it can be seen in the Figure 2, the effects in the total price of the 
electricity is fairly limited upon just changing the energy contract. 
2.3 Nord Pool 
According to Finnish energy authority (2019c), the total amount of electricity 
consumption was 87.4 terawatt hours (TWh) in Finland in 2018. Approximately 23% 
of this electricity was imported from abroad, resulting that the total amount of 
generated electricity in Finland was 67.5 TWh. The deficit was covered mainly via 
Nord Pool’s common power market and also from Russia. The share of residential 
electricity usage was 28 percent from the total consumption in 2018. (Finnish Energy 
Industries, 2019.) 
The role of the Nord Pool is extremely important for Finnish electricity customers in 
two ways. Firstly, Nord Pool enables us to trade electricity across nation’s borders. 
This means that when the transmission constraints are taken into account, electricity 
can be procured from where it is the most cost efficient to produce. And secondly, 
Nord Pool provides the system and area prices for the electricity that works as a 
benchmark for the electricity contracts prices in the retail markets. The common 
wholesale electricity market currently has expanded to nine countries covering the 
original Nordic countries, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, as well as the 
Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The latest additions to the market has 
been gradual expansions to the United Kingdom and Germany. (Nord Pool, 2019e).  
Nord Pool is Europe’s leading power market that offer trading, clearing, settlement 
and associated services. Nord Pool hosts a trading platform for 360 customers from a 
total of 20 countries. In this setting there are different market members who each 
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have specific role to play for the market to function properly. (Nord Pool, 2019g.) 
Table 1 concisely describes what is the function of each market member, and also 
includes brief notes from the Finnish point of view. 
Table 1. Market members in Nord Pool common electricity market (Nord Pool, 2019g). 
Market member Definition Finnish perspective 
Transmission system 
operator (TSO) 
Ensure that an area is electrically 
stable and supplied in a secure 
manner 
In Finland this task is appointed to 
Fingrid Oyj 
a
 
Producer Responsible for power production 
In 2018, 150 electricity producing 
companies and ca. 400 production 
plants 
b 
Distributor (DSO) 
Enable power transmission from 
producers to end-users 
Regulated natural monopolies 
Supplier 
Buys power either directly from a 
producer or through Nord Pool 
72 retail suppliers of which 55 
offered their products nationwide 
c 
Trader 
Represents entity which owns the 
power, while the trading process is 
taking place 
 
Broker 
Similarly, as estate agents do in the 
property markets. A broker does not 
own power, but acts as an 
intermediary 
 
End-users 
Either a company or a private 
household. Can compete the 
suppliers, but cannot do the same 
for TSO or distributor 
In 2018, circa 3.5 million electricity 
customers
c 
a: Nord Pool is owned by TSO’s of Nordic and Baltic countries. Fingrid Oyj owns 18,8% of Nord 
Pool’s shares (Fingrid, 2019b). 
b: The share of the three biggest generating companies of the total installed capacity is about 50 percent 
(Energy authority, 2018b). 
c: According to Energy authority’s national report (2019c).  
From the Finnish perspective, the power exchange in Nord Pool comprises of two 
markets that by nature complement each other and form the basis for the system to 
operate properly. These markets differentiate from each other by their objective. The 
other is  day-ahead market called Elspot, and the other is intraday market called 
15 
Elbas. (Nord Pool, 2019e.) In 2018, a total of 524 TWh of power was traded in the 
Nord Pool. The largest amount of volume (396 TWh) came from the Nordic and 
Baltic day-ahead market. (Nord Pool, 2019a.) 
2.3.1 Day-ahead market, Elspot 
Nord Pool’s day-ahead market Elspot is an auction where sellers and buyers can 
place orders for the delivery of power for the coming day. It is the main platform for 
power trade within the Nord Pool area. The market relies on the participants’ careful 
planning. A buyer estimates next day’s energy demand on an hourly basis, and how 
much it is willing to pay for that volume in each hour. Similarly, the seller decides 
how much she
10
 can deliver and at what price, hour by hour. Nord Pool’s day-ahead 
trading system then receives these orders and forms the market equilibrium price. 
(Nord Pool, 2019c.) This is displayed in the Figure 3, where the equilibrium can be 
seen as the intersection of the demand curve and the supply curve. 
 
Figure 3. System price formation in Nord Pool day-ahead market (Adapted from Nord Pool, 
2019c). 
                                                 
10
 To make the text in this thesis more fluent to read. We have used the pronoun she every time we 
discuss about a person whose gender is unknown.  
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Once the market prices have been calculated the trades are settled. In the following 
day power contracts will be delivered hour by hour according to the agreed contracts. 
(Nord Pool, 2019c). Electricity retailers use these hourly varying prices in their 
dynamic spot price contracts. The basics of these electricity contracts will be 
explained in detail in chapter 3.2.2. In 2018, approximately 70 percent of the total 
electricity consumption of Finland was handled through the Elspot market (Energy 
authority, 2019c). 
2.3.2 Intraday market, Elbas 
Nord Pool’s intraday market Elbas operates as a supplement for the day-ahead 
market and enables the security for the necessary balance between the supply and 
demand in the Northern Europe’s power market. Day-ahead market covers most of 
the traded electricity, and for the most part the balance between supply and demand 
is protected there. However, there may be incidents which can lead to disruptions in 
the equilibrium. This can be for instance malfunction in some of the generation sites 
or sudden increase of demand due to colder than anticipated temperatures. This 
means that the market balance needs to be rearranged within the current day. Unlike 
the day-ahead market, where there is a deadline for submitting bids, the Intraday 
market works as a continuous market, where the trading happens every day around 
the clock, until one hour before the delivery. Prices are set similarly to day-ahead 
market. (Nord Pool, 2019f.) 
The importance of intraday market is currently increasing vastly. This is due to the 
increased amounts of renewable but variable energy sources, such as wind and solar 
power increase their share in the countries’ energy production mix. These energy 
sources are prone by nature to be difficult to accurately forecast, and sudden changes 
in the weather can lead to imbalances between day-ahead contracts and produced 
volume. This imbalance needs to be offset, which inevitably increases the intraday 
trading. This means that the functionality of the intraday market is a significant 
enabler for the increased share of renewable but variable energy sources in the 
energy mixes of different countries. (Nord Pool, 2019f.) The intraday volume 
turnover was 8.3 TWh in 2018. The volume has increased rapidly within the recent 
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years, rising 35 percent between the years 2016 and 2017, and lastly 23 percent 
between 2017 and 2018 (Nord Pool, 2019a).   
2.3.3 Nord Pool’s bidding areas 
In the electricity markets, demand and supply sides are connected through 
transmission and distribution networks. For the system to stay in the equilibrium 
state, the market needs to have sufficient transmission capabilities in order for the 
electricity to be transferred from the generation plant to the end-user. The possible 
constraints in the transmission means that different areas inside the Nord Pool power 
market may need to pay different prices for their electricity. In order to track these 
constraints Nord Pool is divided into several bidding areas (Nord Pool, 2019b).  
The Nord Pool market area covers different countries, however the market itself is 
divided into several bidding areas. Norway, Sweden and Denmark have multiple 
bidding areas within the country, whereas Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are 
each considered as one bidding area. The different bidding areas are formed in order 
to indicate the possible transmission systems constraints, and also ensure that the 
price reflects the regional market conditions. Therefore, the day-ahead market 
provides two different type of prices for the electricity: system price that is same for 
the whole market and area prices that may vary according to the bidding areas 
transmission constraints. If there is no constraints on transmission, system price and 
area price are equal. (Nord Pool, 2019b.) 
System price is calculated solely on the basis of purchase and sales orders. It 
excludes the transmission constraints between the bidding areas and is used as a 
Nordic reference price for trading and clearing of most financial contracts. Area price 
includes the possible bottlenecks in the transmission systems, and therefore forms a 
price that may vary between different bidding areas. Since Finland is only one single 
bidding area, the area price is the same for every end-user in the country. (Nord Pool, 
2019b). Figure 4 shows the different bidding areas for Nordic and Baltic countries, as 
well as the differences in average area prices.  
18 
 
Figure 4. Nord Pool’s bidding areas and area prices
11
 (Nord Pool, 2019d). 
Finland’s dependency on imported electricity often constrains the transmission 
network between Finland and its neighbouring countries. This has drove the Finnish 
area price generally to be higher than the day-ahead system price. The annual 
average price was at its highest level in 2018 for both Finnish area price as well as 
the Nordic system price since the year 2011. (Fingrid, 2019a). Table 2 displays the 
development and magnitude of the price difference between Nordic system price and 
Finnish area price for the past four years. Finland has been paying more from its 
energy due to transmission constraints, however the price difference has been 
gradually decreasing in recent years.     
                                                 
11
 The data is from 22
nd
 of March 2019. The average system price for the day was 40,33€/MWh. 
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Table 2. Difference in the Finnish area prices and Nordic system price in 2015-2018 (Fingrid, 
2018; 2019a). 
 2018 2017 2016 2015 
Day-ahead system price 
€/MWh 
43.99 29.41 26.91 20.98 
Area price in Finland, 
average €/MWh 
46.80 33.19 32.45 29.66 
Difference (Area price/system 
price) 
106.39% 112.85% 120.59% 141.37% 
This chapter has provided a comprehensive examination on the Finnish electricity 
market and how the price of the electricity is formed for the Finnish customers. In 
the next chapter we define and briefly review the options that households face when 
they choose their distribution and electricity contracts. 
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3 ELECTRICITY CONTRACTS IN FINLAND 
This chapter of the thesis focuses on the different contracts that electricity companies 
currently offer to the Finnish residential customers. Because the thesis’ empirical 
questions concentrates on matters around Finnish households’ electricity contracts. 
This chapter will focus more on this topic and only briefly introduce the distribution 
side of the electricity contracts. 
3.1 Network services 
In Finland, the transmission system is handled by a single operator called Fingrid 
Oyj. The company takes care of the nation-wide high-voltage grid, which is the aorta 
of the Finnish electricity network. Its main task is to transmit electricity continuously 
from the generating sites to distribution network companies and industrial 
companies. Fingrid also takes care of the cross-border connections, which connect 
Finnish transmission network to its neighbour countries, hence enabling Finnish 
consumers to participate in the Nordic common power markets. (Fingrid, 2019a.)  
The distribution companies are natural monopolies that base their operations on a 
permit that defines the primary geographical responsibility area of the company. 
(Kopsakangas-Savolainen, 2002). The companies are regulated by the law, and the 
supervision is carried out by the Finnish energy authority. The law dictates that the 
distribution system operators (DSOs) are obligated to supply households and other 
small customers in the area at reasonable prices. All suppliers are required to send 
their offered prices to the online price comparison service
12
 that is maintained by the 
regulator. (Annala, Viljainen & Tuunanen, 2013.)  
The reasonableness of the prices are calculated by using weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) model that is updated annually (Energy authority, 2015). For the 
year 2019, Energy authority has determined that the WACC yields as a reasonable 
rate of return for network services is 6.20% for the distribution and 5.36% for the 
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 Website for the online price comparison service is: www.sahkonhinta.fi. 
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transmission services. (Energy authority, 2019b.) In Finland, the deregulation of the 
electricity markets did not include privatization, hence many of the DSOs are still 
locally owned, often by municipalities. (Annala et al., 2013.)  
However, over the recent years some of the largest energy companies in Finland, for 
instance Fortum and Vattenfall, have sold their electricity distribution networks to 
domestic and international investors (Annala, 2015). These investor led distribution 
companies have been investing heavily into underground cabling, and by doing so 
gradually replacing the overhead lines that are prone to be vulnerable for extreme 
weather conditions (Ala-Kokko, 2018). These events have drastically changed the 
landscape of the Finnish distribution networks, since the investments have been 
funded by increasing the distribution prices significantly over the past few years. 
According to the Energy authority’s online price comparison service, the domestic 
distribution tariffs for regular homeowner
13
 has increased over 28 percent in five 
years from 4.56 c/kWh in January 2014 to the price of 5.87 c/kWh in the first of 
April 2019. (Energy authority, 2019a.) There are substantial regional variations that 
can significantly increase or decrease the total price of electricity for the household. 
For instance, the average distribution price in the first day of April 2019, was 4.44 
c/kWh in Northern Finland, while simultaneously the average distribution price in 
Eastern Finland was 8.32 c/kWh. This means that in regional level the increased 
distribution tariffs may exceed or be lower than the 28 percent level of increase. 
(Energy authority, 2019a.)   
The rapid surges in distribution prices and increased differences between different 
regions has led to increased participation of the regulating authorities. The final push 
for the demand of more active regulator came through the public uproar that 
followed after a DSO Caruna
14
 proposed over sudden 20 percent increases in the 
electricity tariffs in 2016. This led to the amendment of the electricity market 
legislation, which currently restricts DSO’s and TSO’s right to increase network 
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 Consumer’s annual consumption 5000 kWh, average distribution tariff for the whole country. 
14
 Caruna currently operates distribution network that was sold by Fortum in 2014. It has the largest 
share of the distribution markets in Finland. 
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tariffs by maximum 15 percent during rolling period of 12 months. (Energy 
authority, 2018b; Electricity Market Act (4:26a §).)  
Even though homeowners in Finland cannot compete their DSOs, they can still 
choose between different contract types or tariffs that the distribution companies 
offer. The three most common tariffs that are offered are: fixed-rate tariff, two-rate 
(i.e. time-of-day) tariff and seasonal tariff. The basic pricing structure for all of these 
three tariffs are the same: monthly basic charge (€/month) and an energy charge 
(c/kWh). (Ruokamo, Kopsakangas-Savolainen, Meriläinen & Svento, 2018.) 
Fixed-rate tariff operates in a pretty straight forward fashion. The charge (c/kWh) of 
the electricity is constant for every hour of the year. The two-rate tariff and seasonal 
tariffs are so called time of use tariffs that have varying prices according to the load. 
In two-rate tariff the charge varies for days and nights, lower charge during the night-
time load and vice versa. In the seasonal tariff the structure is the same, however the 
change variable is the season of the year rather than time of day. Energy charge is 
higher when the system load is higher, mainly during winter workdays, and cheaper 
in other times. These time of use tariffs encourage customers to plan their electricity 
usage and possibly ease the burden of the system during peak load times, however 
they do not necessarily provide flexibility to the markets when it is required. As an 
option for this problem a new alternative dynamic load-based tariff has been 
proposed, called power-based tariff (PBT). This tariff charges consumers based on 
their utilized peak power capacity, which would create an incentive for households to 
smoothen their consumption profile and limit their peak power usage. (Ruokamo et 
al., 2018.) Variations of PBT has already been taken gradually into use by three 
pioneering companies in Finland (Happonen, 2019). 
3.2 Electricity contracts 
The Finnish electricity retail market can be deemed as fairly competitive. The market 
consists of 72 retail suppliers, of which 55 offered their products nation-wide in 
Finland. The market concentration in the Finnish electricity retail market is around 
600 to 700 in Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). (Energy authority, 2019c.) The 
index takes into account the relative size distribution of the firms in the market. The 
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maximum value of the index is 10 000, which would mean that the market is 
controlled by a single firm. On the contrary when a market is occupied by a large 
number of firms of relatively equal size value of the index approaches to zero. (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2018.) 
Finnish customers’ participation in the retail market can be evaluated in two 
categories, signing a new contract and switching a supplier. Finnish consumers seem 
to be relatively active to compete their electricity contracts, but switching the 
supplier is fairly scarce. According to Nordic Energy Regulators study (2019), 
approximately 87 percent of the Finnish customers’ state that they have signed a new 
contract with an electricity supplier, which was the highest rate among the Nordic 
countries. Out of these customers 39 percent state that they signed a new contract 
during the last 12 months, which again was the highest amount compared to Sweden, 
Norway and Denmark. However, according to Finnish energy authority’s latest 
national report (2019c), the percentage number of household customers that has 
switched a supplier during a calendar year, has been around 10 to 12 percent for the 
past few years. These numbers indicate that Finnish households are relatively active 
in competing their electricity agreements, however they seem to be loyal for their 
current suppliers. The information of supplier switch rate is presented in detail in 
Table 3.   
Table 3. The share of Finnish electricity customers who have changed the supplier in 2013-2018 
(Adapted from Energy authority, 2019c). 
 Households and other permanent dwellings 
Year <10 000 kWh/a >10 000 kWh/a 
2013 10.2 % 12.7 % 
2014 11.8 % 11.2 % 
2015 12.5 % 13.1 % 
2016
15
 12.4 % 
2017 11.3 % 
2018 11.1% 
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 Since 2016 grouping used in data collection was changed. Data has been divided into two groups: 
household customers and other customers. 
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The retail market of electricity has been opened for competition more than two 
decades in Finland. The fairly stable supplier switch rates shown in Table 3 represent 
quite adequately the stagnant development in the consumer behaviour in supplier 
switching. Two decades is also a long time for the technological developments in the 
electricity infrastructure. In fact, Finland has been globally in a forefront in the 
installation of the smart meters
16
 to nearly all of the energy consumers (Energy 
authority, 2019c). This is a part of smart grid deployment that is seen as a significant 
opportunity to reduce carbon emissions at all levels and gain comparative advantage 
in the clean technology markets in a global scale. (Zhou & Brown, 2016.) The 
comprehensive roll out of these devices, which detect the use of hourly measured 
consumption data has made it possible for electricity suppliers to offer all customers 
dynamic electricity contracts, where the price reflects the price at the Nord Pool spot 
market. These contracts are known as real-time pricing (RTP) contracts, or more 
commonly spot pricing contracts. (Ruokamo et al., 2018.) 
Finland has sufficient technology in place that enable customers to choose and 
switch their electricity contracts freely and according to latest trends. Finland’s 
electricity network infrastructure enables electricity suppliers to offer various types 
of electricity contracts. However, a rough division can be made depending on the 
pricing schemes of the contracts. This means that the contracts are divided into either 
fixed rates or dynamic rates. 
3.2.1 Fixed rate 
Fixed rate contracts are straightforward from the customer’s point of view. On top of 
possible monthly fees, customer pays a fixed rate (c/kWh) for the used electricity no 
matter when or how much of the electricity is used. It is a simple contract for the 
consumer, since the price does not change and the only way of having any influence 
on the electricity bill is to simply adjust the usage of the electricity.  
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 By the end of 2018, more than 99 percent of consumption places in Finland had installed a smart 
meter. 
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Even though the fundamental idea of the fixed rate contract is really simple. The 
range of different kinds of fixed rate products that suppliers offer to households is 
quite vast. Basically, when a consumer compares different fixed rate contracts, she 
has four comparable and interchangeable categories, which together form the 
product.  
First category is the basic fee of the contract. This charge is either monthly or yearly 
fee that is added on top of the consumption of the electricity. The basic fee covers 
retailers fixed costs and is charged regardless of the consumption (Sähkönvertailu, 
2019). Basic fees in Finnish energy bills typically range between zero and five euros 
per month. This means that during months of lower consumption the unit price of the 
electricity is higher than during months of higher consumption.   
The second category is the production method of the electricity. The importance of 
this category has arguably increased within the last few years due to the increased 
awareness of environmental issues and strong public demand towards more 
sustainable options also in electricity contracts. For instance, households’ willingness 
to pay a premium for green energy have been widely shown in academic studies (see 
e.g. Sundt & Rehdanz, 2015; Kaenzig, Heinzle & Wüstenhagen, 2013). This can also 
be seen in the contracts that the electricity companies offer to consumers. For 
instance, Vattenfall offers contracts that have same prices and terms but different 
production methods. Depending on the preference of the customer she can choose 
contract that ensures the electricity is generated either by wind, hydro, solar or 
nuclear (Vattenfall, 2019.) Oulun Energia also offers its customers the option to 
choose a responsible production method, with a principle that the higher the price, 
the more sustainable the generation method is (Oulun Energia, 2019).
17
     
Third category is the duration of the contract. According to the Finnish energy 
authority’s national report (2019c), in 2018 the most common type of supply contract 
was open-ended contract with indefinite validity. The contract may be terminated 
with two weeks’ notice. It was chosen by about 49 percent of retail customers. 
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 Biomass and hydro: 1€/month, Wind: 2€/month and Solar: 3€/month.   
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Second most popular contract type was the fixed term contract that was chosen by 41 
percent of customers. Typically, the duration of the fixed term is between one or two 
years and during this period the price of the electricity is fixed. The rest nine percent 
of the retail customers had dynamic electricity price contracts. This distribution 
illustrates how popular fixed term contracts are compared to dynamic alternatives. 
The last category is the price of the energy. Retailers offer prices that are close to the 
area price that is formed in the Nord Pool Elspot marketplace. On top of this the 
retailers add their own margins that typically reflect the so-called ingredients of the 
contract. Traditional and still by far the most common way of pricing the energy is 
cents per kilowatt hours (c/kWh), which means that the energy is charged depending 
on the used amounts of energy. However, retail companies, such as Fortum, Imatran 
Seudun Sähkö and Oulun Energia, have recently started to offer contracts which have 
fixed price per month for a certain quota and extra costs for the exceeding usage. For 
instance, Imatran Seudun Sähkö offers small, medium and large “packages” 
depending on the household’s annual consumption. The small contract, that is 
targeted for the households that have annual consumption of 3000 kWh’s, includes 
basic monthly charge and fixed price of 11.90€/month. This enables the customer to 
use 250kWh/month. If the usage exceeds this amount the customer pays quarterly 
changing fixed rate for every extra kWh
18
. (Imatran Seudun Sähkö, 2019.) This type 
of contract is similar to mobile phone bills. For the electricity market point of view 
this contract type proposes issues that are somewhat polarized. On the other hand, the 
customer is motivated to obey the consumption quotas. However, this can mean that 
there can be significant peaks in demand at the end of each month, because the 
customer is incentivized to use all the possible excess electricity that is left in the 
quota. The fit of these contracts in Finnish environment is questionable since the 
demand of electricity is strongly correlated with the need for residential space 
heating. In 2017 space heating corresponded 68% of the total energy consumption in 
households (OSF, 2018). The need for space heating obviously varies a lot 
depending on the weather. A household’s monthly electricity usage during summer 
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 The price for the extra electricity varies according to market prices.  
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months tend to be vastly lower than during winter months. Having same quotas for 
electricity use every month is therefore arguably a problematic solution in Finland.  
3.2.2 Dynamic pricing 
According to Borenstein (2013) there is a consensus that dynamic, or time-varying, 
retail pricing for electricity would improve the efficiency of electricity systems and 
would lower the total cost of meeting electricity demand. Borenstein suggests that 
the primary benefit in dynamic pricing schemes is that it allows the retail power 
supplier to give consumers an incentive to reduce consumption at peak times, when 
the system is strained and shift the consumption toward lower demand times when 
supply is ample. The most dynamic contract type is real-time pricing (RTP), which 
reflects the scarcity in the power system by having, typically, hourly varying prices 
depending on the state of the power system. RTP program is widely considered to 
have significant potential to increase flexibility in the demand side of the power 
markets. (Ruokamo et al., 2018.) In fact, academic studies have shown that dynamic 
pricing does have an affect on households’ consumption behaviour. For instance, 
study made by Allcott (2011) showed that consumers that had RTP contracts 
conserved energy during peak hours and did not increase their average consumption 
during off-peak times. When there are plenty of households that participate in 
demand response, this could mean smoothened demand peaks, therefore more 
efficiently operating electricity markets.  
Similarly to fixed rate contracts, there are also variations in the contract terms for 
dynamic priced contracts. Dynamic pricing schemes in Finland can be categorized 
either to time-varying or load based programs. In time-varying programs, the rate 
depends on when electricity is demanded, whereas in load-based programs the rate is 
determined by the current power load level of the household. (Ruokamo et al., 2018.) 
Other forms of dynamic electricity pricing schemes that are used abroad are for 
instance block pricing and critical peak pricing. In block pricing scheme the marginal 
price of electricity increases according to total quantity consumed. In critical peak 
pricing scheme consumers pay most of the time a standard rate, but on occasional 
high price days they pay higher prices or receive rebates for energy conservation. 
These kind of contracts are also called peak-time rebate contracts. (Allcott, 2011.) 
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In Finland, RTP contracts follow the Nord Pool’s day-ahead spot market that has 
hourly changing prices for the electricity. Retailers then add their premiums to the 
spot price and sell it to the customers. Premiums vary between the retailers and 
sometimes retailer can offer different contracts on the basis of the generation method. 
For instance, Vattenfall (2019) currently offers normal RTP contract with premium 
of 0.29 c/kWh, as well as so called EKO contract, which is ten cents more expensive, 
but the electricity is fully generated by wind power. 
RTP contracts are typically valid indefinitely, which means that the contract is 
binding as long as the customer is satisfied. Spot market-based contracts are suitable 
for households that are interested in the development of the electricity market prices 
as well as able and willing to shape their consumption behaviour according to the 
spot prices. Household can follow the hourly varying price online or via mobile 
applications and plan the individual energy consumption pattern accordingly. 
(Karjalainen, 2018.)  
From the customer’s point of view, spot market-based contracts enable consumers to 
always pay the market price for the used electricity. This means that the consumers 
face volatility risks in their contracts but can also obtain more savings in their 
electricity bills by simply shifting consumption from high demand peaks to low 
demand. During low demand hours, the price of the electricity is cheaper, hence RTP 
contracts are suitable option for informed consumers that can easily affect their 
consumption for instance via smart appliances or automated home heating systems.   
As established earlier in this thesis, according to Finnish energy authority (2019c), 
the share of retail customers that had dynamic contracts was 9 percent in the year 
2018. These contracts include RTP as well as other dynamic contracts that have 
prices varying in different degree, i.e. on monthly basis. Even though this is a 
relatively low share of the total users, the trend is growing. In 2016 the share of 
households that had dynamic contracts was roughly seven percent. The increase of 
two percentage points signals the increasing demand for these types of contracts. 
(Energy authority, 2017; 2019c.) 
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This chapter has explained the different alternatives from which the customer 
chooses her electricity contract. It should be noted that even though money seems to 
be the most important factor that guides households, it is not the only thing that 
matters when the contract is chosen. Other factors that customers consider important 
are for instance environmental issues and support for local suppliers. Customers are 
inclined to pay a premium on their electricity, if the electricity is generated by using 
sustainable and renewable energy sources or if the electricity company is a local 
operator. (Nordic Energy Regulators, 2019.) Table 4 summarizes the different 
options that households in Finland have when they make the decision on their 
electricity contracts.  
Table 4. Households’ options in electricity contracts and factors that cannot be influenced. 
Components Decisions for households Factors that cannot be influenced 
Distribution - Tariff
 a
 
- Distribution company 
- Distribution prices 
- Contract length 
Energy 
- Retail company 
- Production method 
- Pricing scheme of the contract 
b
 
- Duration of the contract c 
- Area price d 
Taxes -  
- VAT 
- Energy tax 
- Sales tax 
a: i.e. Fixed-rate or two-rate, for instance day-night or seasonal 
b: i.e. Fixed price for electricity, RTP contract, fixed monthly fee, time-of-day, seasonal 
c: Valid indefinitely or Fixed term, typically between one to two years 
d: Area price for Finland is given by the Nord Pool day-ahead market, and acts as a base for the retailer’s offered 
price   
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4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter we introduce the theoretical framework and empirical approach of this 
thesis. The theoretical framework comes from discrete choice theory. The empirical 
part utilize discrete choice binary logit (BL) model. 
4.1 Discrete choice theory 
When studying the microeconomic activity where decision maker evaluates so called 
all-or-nothing alternatives, we are talking about discrete events. Either something is 
or is not. Discrete choice framework investigates choices made by the individuals 
among finite set of alternatives. Fundamentally discrete choice is about modelling 
discrete outcomes and responses to survey questions about the strength of 
preferences or about self-assessed health or well-being. In these cases, the dependent 
variable is not a quantitative measure of an economic outcome, instead it is an 
indicator of the occurrence of some outcome. In other words, discrete choice is about 
modelling probabilities and using econometric tools to make probabilistic statements 
about the occurrence of these events. (Greene, 2012.)  
Discrete choice framework has three common features that typically arise in all 
discrete choice models. First feature is the choice set that depicts the set of 
alternative options that the decision maker has. Simply put, choice set represents the 
set of alternatives of which the decision-making unit chooses the preferred option. To 
fit within a discrete choice framework the choice set has to meet three requirements. 
First, choosing one alternative inevitably means that none of the other alternatives 
can be chosen, i.e. alternatives must be mutually exclusive. Second, all possible 
alternatives need to be included, meaning the decision-making unit chooses 
inevitably one of the alternatives, i.e. alternatives are collectively exhaustive. Lastly, 
the choice set must contain finite number of alternatives, so that the researcher can 
count the alternatives and therefore be finished with counting at some point. (Train, 
2009.)  
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For the purposes of this study we can make a fair assumption that a household must 
have one electricity contract, and the marginal utility of acquiring a second contract 
is zero, since dwelling’s electricity needs are always fulfilled with a single contract. 
Having two simultaneous electricity contracts in one address is in fact not possible. 
This means that a Finnish household has to choose one electricity contract in order to 
obtain electricity. Choosing one contract means that no other contracts can be 
chosen. And the retail market for electricity contains finite number of companies and 
contracts. This means that the choice set of electricity contracts for Finnish 
households fulfils all three requirements that discrete choice framework requires. 
Second feature in the discrete choice theory is the determination of utility for 
different alternatives in the choice set. It is a common practice that economists do 
when they try to model and describe the benefit that a consumer receives when she 
consumes a product or service or makes purchase decisions. Utility can be 
considered as somewhat arbitrary concept since it does not have no natural level or 
scale. (Train, 2009.) This does not diminish the concepts value for researchers; 
however, it does mean that direct comparisons between utility levels of different 
studies is obsolete. 
According to neoclassical economics, the economy is portrayed as interactions 
between a collection of profit maximizing firms and utility-maximizing households 
that operate in perfectly competitive markets. The idea that households or “rational 
economic entity” maximizes her utility or self-interest is often referred by 
economists as rationality axiom. (Boerger, 2016.)  People may not actively think 
about their utility levels during their everyday life but through their actions and 
decisions, for instance when they make purchase decisions, they do provide signals 
of their utility levels towards certain products or services. In discrete choice models 
the usual assumption is that decision maker chooses the alternative that maximizes 
her utility. This is also called the decision rule assumption. (Train, 2009.)      
The previously mentioned axioms provide the basis for this thesis’ research 
surroundings. From the researchers’ point of view, it is important to define the utility 
levels correctly to be able to interpret the results properly. However, no matter how 
comprehensive the survey or other data gathering method is, there will always be at 
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least some level of stochastic elements that are specific to and known only by the 
individual, but not by the researcher. In order to interpret the data on individual 
choices, economists use random utility models (RUMs). (Greene, 2012.) 
RUMs are derived on the basis of early work done by Thurstone (1927), Marschak 
(1959) and McFadden (1974). In these models, the decision maker is assumed to 
operate in utility-maximizing manner, albeit it does not preclude the other forms of 
behaviour. (Train, 2009.) Mathematically RUMs are derived in the following 
manner. A decision maker, labelled as n, has to make a choice among alternatives, 
labelled as J. All of the alternatives provide a certain level of utility, labelled as U, 
for the decision maker. In mathematical formula, this can be denoted as: UnJ > 0 ∀ J. 
The utility that decision maker receives from different alternatives, for instance 
alternative j, can be denoted as: Unj, j = 1,…,J. This level of utility is known by the 
decision maker, however not by the researcher. According to decision rule, the 
alternative that is chosen by the decision maker provides the highest level of utility. 
In the context of this example, the decision maker will choose alternative i over 
alternative j, if and only if Uni >Unj ∀  j ≠ i. (Train, 2009.) 
The RUM framework takes into account that the researcher is not able to observe all 
characteristics of utility. Hence the utility equation is often represented with a 
formula that includes the so-called random term that is typically denoted with 
epsilon, ɛ. (Greene, 2012.) The actual formula for RUM can be portrayed concisely 
in the following manner: 
𝑈𝑛𝐽  =  𝑉𝑛𝐽  +  𝜀𝑛𝐽. (1) 
And since the researcher is not able to observe all the characteristics of utility, the 
utility is then divided into two components that represent the observable and 
unobservable factors. In the equation (1), V denotes the observable factors and is 
often called representative utility. These observable factors can include various 
measurable characteristics or attributes, but for the sake of simplicity in this formula 
V is used to denote them all. If the researcher would be able to observe all the factors 
that affect to utility, the formula would simply be: UnJ = VnJ . However, RUM 
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framework acknowledges the fact that the researcher is unable to observe and 
measure all the factors, therefore the formula also includes ɛ to denote the stochastic 
factors that cannot be observed by the researcher, but still affect to the utility. This 
breakdown is fully general, since ɛnJ  is defined as the difference between the true 
utility and the representative utility, seen in equation (2) below: (Train, 2009; 
Greene, 2012.)  
𝑈𝑛𝐽  −  𝑉𝑛𝐽  =  𝜀𝑛𝐽. (2) 
With carefully designed surveys the share of the unobserved attributes can be 
diminished, making the research outcomes more reliable.  
Third common feature in the discrete choice theory is defining choice probabilities 
for particular alternatives in the choice set. The process of defining choice 
probabilities is closely linked with the utility determination, since through different 
levels of utility researcher can assess what alternative in the choice set is the 
preferred option for the studied decision-maker. (Train, 2009.) For purposes of 
studying behaviour of individual people, we will form models that link the decision 
or outcome to a set of factors, at least in the spirit of regression. The general 
framework of probability models is: 
𝑃(𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑗 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠) = 𝑃(𝑌 = 𝑗) = 𝐹[𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠]. (3) 
The “event” is an individual’s choice among two or more alternatives. The study of 
qualitative choice for the probabilities of these events focuses on appropriate 
specification, estimation and usage of models. (Greene, 2012.) 
Defining choice probabilities is the part of discrete choice models that specifies a 
certain probability for a decision maker to choose different alternatives. This 
probability is expressed as a function of observed variables that relate to the 
alternatives in the choice set and to the decision maker. The researcher can make a 
general probabilistic statement that a decision maker chooses alternative i over 
alternatives J in a following RUM environment: (Train, 2009.)  
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𝑃𝑛𝑗 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑛𝑖 > 𝑈𝑛𝑗  ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) 
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑛𝑖 > 𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗 ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) 
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜀𝑛𝑗  −  𝜀𝑛𝑖  <  𝑉𝑛𝑖  −  𝑉𝑛𝑗 ∀ 𝑗 ≠  𝑖). (4) 
This equation is the basis of choice probabilities in RUM environment.  
Standard microeconomic theory suggests that a consumer always acts rationally and 
maximizes her utility. However, at the forefront of behaviour economics, Simon 
(1982) challenges the traditional line of thought and suggests that rationality is 
bounded due to limitations on our thinking capacity, available information and time. 
This bounded rationality can be seen in discrete choice theory for instance through 
default effects, meaning that when a decision-maker is confronted by a choice with a 
default option, they often are predisposed to accept the default choice (Fowlie, 
Wolfram, Spurlock, Todd, Baylis & Cappers, 2017). It is estimated by Annala et al. 
(2013) that in the Finnish electricity market, approximately 60 to 70 percent of 
residential customers purchase their electricity from their local supplier with default 
contracts. They also studied that majority of these customers could have saved 
money, if they had competed and switched their supplier contracts. Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that the two phenomena: default effects and bounded 
rationality, are present in the electricity markets.  
4.2 Empirical model 
In this thesis, the discrete regression model that we use is logit, which is considered 
the easiest and hence most widely used discrete choice model. Arguably the 
popularity of logit model stems from the fact that the formula for the choice 
probabilities takes a closed form and is readily interpretable. Logit models assume 
that the unobserved factors, i.e. ɛs does not correlate with each other alternatives and 
have the same variance between each other. However, it should be noted that this 
assumption of independence can be inappropriate in some situations. (Train, 2009.)  
The biggest differentiative factor between logistic regression models and linear 
regression models is the fact that the outcome variable in logistic regressions is 
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dichotomous or binary. This difference is reflected both in the choice of a parametric 
model and in the assumptions. The estimation of binary choice models is usually 
based on the method of maximum likelihood rather than minimizing the sum of 
squared errors. When these differences are taken into account, the methods that are 
used in the analysis using logistic regression follow the same general principles that 
are also used in linear regression. (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000; Greene, 2012.) 
Train (2009) states three arguments that clarifies the power and limitations of logit 
models’ abilities to represent choice behaviour. These three arguments are: taste 
variation, substitution patterns and repeated choices over time. Concisely the first 
argument means that logit can represent systematic taste variations that relates to 
observed characteristics of the decision maker, but not random taste variation. This 
means that the tastes cannot be linked to observed characteristics. The second 
argument means that the logit model indicates corresponding substitution across 
alternatives, given the researcher’s definition of representative utility. Other models 
are needed to acquire more flexible forms of substitution. And the third topic means 
that logit works well when the unobserved factors are independent over time in 
repeated choice situations. However, if the unobserved factors are correlated over 
time, logit cannot handle these situations well. (Train, 2009.) This means that the 
researches abilities to pinpoint the important information is highlighted. For instance, 
in the context of this research, a household may state that environmental issues are 
always close to heart when making consumption decisions. However, the same 
household may exclude the arguably environmentally friendlier alternative in 
electricity contracts, due to lack of knowledge of the dimensions of different 
contracts.  
According to Train (2009), the logit model has evolved from the origins of Luce 
(1959) through the completion of the formula by McFadden (1974). Using the same 
notations as in earlier equations in chapter 4.1. and adding a specific distribution for 
unobserved utility, the logit model can be derived. We again have the same setting as 
in equation (1)
19
. By assuming that each ɛnj is independently and identically 
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 𝑈𝑛𝑗  =  𝑉𝑛𝑗  +  𝜀𝑛𝑗 ∀ 𝐽 . 
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distributed (iid) extreme value, we can obtain the logit model. For each unobserved 
component of the utility the density is: 
ʄ(𝜀𝑛𝐽)  =  ℯ
−ℰ𝑛𝑗ℯ−ℯ
−ℰ𝑛𝑗
 , (5) 
and the cumulative distribution is: 
𝐹(𝜀𝑛𝐽)  = ℯ
−ℯ
−ℰ𝑛𝑗
.  (6) 
Train (2009) reminds that the key assumption in logit models is not so much to focus 
on the distribution of error terms, but rather on the statement that the errors are 
independent of each other. He also states that the independence assumption is not as 
restrictive as it may seem. For a well-specified model, the independence can be 
interpreted as a natural outcome. The ultimate goal for the researcher is to specify the 
observed variables Vnj sufficiently enough, so that the unobserved portion, ɛ, of the 
utility is essentially redundant, or as Train put it: “white noise”. Therefore, the goal is 
to specify utility well enough that a logit model is appropriate. (Train, 2009.) This 
description about logit models works as a basis for this thesis modelling framework.  
The data will be analysed through three logistic regressions. The scope of these 
regressions is to find the best fitting, yet reasonable model to describe the 
relationship between dependent variable and a set of explanatory variables. The 
regressions generate coefficients, including standard errors and significance levels, of 
a formula in order to predict a logit transformation of the probability of presence of 
the characteristic of interest. (Medcalc, 2019). For instance, the formula for a 
probability for a respondent that is willing to acquire electricity contract that includes 
electricity consumption control would be: 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝)𝑊𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐷𝑅  =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝑋1  + 𝛽2𝑋2  +  … +  𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛. (7) 
where p denotes the probability that a respondent either accepts or rejects the 
dependent variable, in this case WILLDR. βo denotes the intercept and other β’s 
represent the coefficients and X’s represent the explanatory variables.  
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The value calculated for p denotes whether the respondent is willing to acquire 
electricity contract that includes electricity consumption control. In this research if 
the p receives a value that is 0 < p ≤ 0.49, the respondent would not be willing to 
acquire the aforementioned contract, whereas if the value is 0.50 ≤ p ≤ 1, the 
response would be yes. Therefore, we can say that pWILLDR is the representative utility 
for the willingness to acquire demand response contracts. 
This thesis’ dependent variables are all dichotomous that fulfil the discrete choice 
theory’s choice set requirements. All three dependent variables will be analysed 
through three separate regressions that are all done according Binary Logit (BL) 
models, a framework that was completed by McFadden (1974). In the used BL 
models the choice probability is of the form: 
𝑃𝑛(𝑗 = 1) =  
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽1𝑋𝑛)
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽1𝑋𝑛)
 . (8) 
In this equation β1 is the vector of estimated parameters for a choice j and Xn is the 
corresponding vector of explanatory variables.  
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5 DATA 
In this chapter, the empirical data of this thesis is presented. Moreover, we describe 
the dependent and explanatory variables.   
5.1 Data description 
The empirical data of this thesis is obtained from a survey that was conducted in 
2016 by a group of researchers from University of Oulu and Finnish Environment 
Institute (SYKE). The survey was designed on the basis of two thorough pilot studies 
that tested the quantitative and qualitive features of the study. The pilot studies were 
conducted in order to make sure that the survey is both understandable and credible 
to the respondents. (Ruokamo et al., 2018.)  
The first pilot was qualitative study that was done in the fall of 2015. In this study 
the final survey was pretested by interviewing small group of Finns. The focus was 
on presenting the questions to the respondents in the most understandable manner.  
The second pilot was quantitative and broader study that was carried out with an 
internet survey in Webropol. This pilot focused more on the empirical aspects of the 
final survey. (Ruokamo et al., 2018.) 
The final survey was conducted in October 2016. Based on the second pilot, the 
researchers selected homeowners as a target group for the survey since their response 
rate was significantly higher than individuals who lived in rental flats or houses. The 
survey was done via mail invitations that included instructions on how to answer the 
internet survey. The instructions were sent to four thousand homeowners that were 
randomly picked from the civil registry, i.e. Population Information System of 
Finland. The age range of the target population was limited to 24 − 75 years old to 
exclude individuals that still live with their parents or presumably have short period 
of home ownership. (Ruokamo et al., 2018.)  
The number of received responses was 380, which results in response rate of 9,5%. It 
is acknowledged that the response rate is relatively low, therefore the collected 
sample may suffer in some degree from non-response bias. Due to time and budget 
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constraints, the group were not able to send reminder letter that likely would have 
had positive impacts on the overall response rate. Other possible reasons for the low 
response rate could be the selected survey mode, in this case the internet survey, as 
well as the difficulty of the subject matter and general lack of interest toward energy 
issues among households. For the exclusion of selection bias, the respondents were 
also asked if their profession has any links to energy industry or electricity markets. 
Only 6.8 percent of the respondents reported that they work is related to energy 
sector indicating that there is no significant bias towards having more than expected 
“professionals” among the respondents. (Ruokamo et al., 2018.) Also, it should be 
noted that the survey was conducted briefly after the DSO Caruna raised distribution 
costs for its customers that caused a nationwide discussion about the state of Finnish 
distribution system
20
. This may have caused some reporting bias among the 
respondents, however due to the fact that this research is more interested in the 
energy contracts rather than distribution contracts, this should not propose an issue in 
this research. 
Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics of the respondents’ socio-demographic 
characteristics and the corresponding statistics of either national average or the 
survey averages. The sample consists of homeowners that are more educated and 
somewhat older than the average Finnish homeowners. Also, the amount of men 
respondents were slightly higher than women. The similar distribution patterns 
concerning sex and age distribution have been also observed in two Swedish energy-
related studies (Broberg & Persson, 2016; Ek & Söderholm, 2010). We can speculate 
that these findings can be explained by the increased overall interest toward energy 
issues among this group. Due to aforementioned reasons, the overall results of the 
survey should be fairly valid, however not fully generalizable for all Finnish 
homeowners. (Ruokamo et al., 2018.) 
 
                                                 
20
 Briefly discussed in the chapter 3.1 of this thesis. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the respondents (N=380) (Adapted from Ruokamo et al., 2018). 
 
Respondents 
Corresponding 
statistics 
Socio-demographic characteristics   
 Average Average 
Age (years) 56.4 52.1
a 
Household size 2.4 2.2
b 
 Percent Percent 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
 
43.2 
56.8 
 
50.0
a 
50.0
a 
Household’s income (gross, €/month) (N=374) 
<4 000 
4 000-5 999 
6 000-7 999 
8 000-9 999 
>10 000 
 
31.8 
31.0 
18.4 
9.4 
9.4 
 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Education (N=379) 
Polytechnic or university degree 
 
56.2 
 
24.0
c 
Living environment 
City 
Town, sparsely populated area or small population center 
 
59.7 
40.3 
 
N/A 
N/A 
Dwelling type 
Detached or semi-detached house 
Terraced house 
Apartment building 
 
67.4 
11.8 
20.8 
 
64.5
d 
13.3
d 
22.2
d 
N/A: Not available 
a: Corresponding statistics of the original sample of 4 000 homeowners 
b: Corresponding statistics of Finnish homeowners ( OSF, 2016b). 
c: Corresponding statistics of Finnish population aged 20-74 (OSF, 2016a). 
d: Corresponding statistics of Finnish dwellings (Energy authority, 2017). 
The survey consisted of over hundred questions. For this thesis the most important 
questions that the survey contained were the following three:  
1. Do you have a fixed rate electricity contract?  
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2. Have you considered a spot price contract where the price of electricity varies 
hourly?  
3. Are you willing to acquire a contract that includes electricity consumption 
control where your consumption is shifted from peak hours to off peak hours?   
Based on these questions, three dependent variables are created for the regressions. 
The response distributions for these three questions are visually demonstrated in 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Respondents’ electricity contracts and readiness for demand response (N=380). 
5.2 Dependent and explanatory variables 
Table 6 presents concisely the dependent variables as well as the means of the 
variables. Each variable will be examined more thoroughly in the following 
paragraphs. 
Table 6.  Dependent variables and response distribution in the regressions (N=380). 
Dependent variable Definition Yes
* 
No
* 
DNK (1 if yes) I do not know if I have a fixed rate electricity contract 13.4 86.6 
RTP (1 if yes) 
I have considered acquiring a spot price contract or I 
already have one 
15.5 84.5 
WILLDR (1 if yes) 
I am willing to acquire electricity contract that includes 
demand response (electricity consumption control) 
54.0 46.0 
*: Values in percentages  
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The variable DNK represents the share of respondents who did not know whether 
their electricity contract is fixed rate or not. Surprisingly many respondents were 
unable to state what kind of electricity contract they have. This result is somewhat in 
line with the results from the latest consumer behaviour research in the Nordic 
electricity market which stated that 87 percent of the Finnish household can name 
their electricity supplier. This means that 13 percent of the respondents do not know 
which company is sending them electricity bills, and also, that they are unaware of 
how much and in what terms they are paying for their electricity. (Nordic Energy 
Regulators, 2019.) This further embraces the need to gain more information about 
the consumer knowledge on the electricity market, to better understand and enhance 
the structure of demand side of the market. It should also be noted that in the survey 
fixed rate contracts and spot price contracts are distinctively explained just before the 
question is presented. This assures that the respondents are fully aware what is asked 
and that they do not confuse the energy contracts with distribution contracts. Hence, 
the 13.4 percent of respondents that do not know their electricity contract type can be 
seen as a credible share.   
The second variable RTP represents the share of respondents who either have RTP 
contract, or then have considered of acquiring one. Earlier on chapter 3.2.2. we 
discussed about the benefits of RTP contracts. Therefore, studying people’s attitudes 
towards RTP contracts is well-grounded. There are number of academic studies 
made about how RTP contracts enhance electricity markets. According to 
Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento (2010), RTP contracts diminishes the need for 
total production capacity even with inelastic demand. They also state that as the 
share of the RTP customers increase or demand becomes more price elastic, the price 
of the peak demand hour clearly lowers. For other researches, see for instance Huuki, 
Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento (2014), Borenstein (2013) and Ruokamo et al. 
(2018). 
We argue that the benefits from widespread adoption of RTP contracts comes from 
the fact that if electricity users would adjust their consumption according to time-
varying electricity prices, or other signals about the state of the power system, it 
would enable more efficient use of generation and network assets. For instance, our 
environment would benefit vastly from this, due to facilitation of matching 
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intermittent generation of renewable energy with electricity demand. (Annala, 2015.) 
Therefore, researching people’s willingness and unwillingness to acquire RTP 
contracts is valid to gain more perspective on the reasons that deters people from 
acquiring these contracts. 
The last variable WILLDR measures consumers’ willingness to take more active role 
in the electricity markets. In the survey, the respondent’s willingness to adjust their 
electricity consumption, or demand response, was asked. Roughly 54 percent of the 
respondents answered yes to this question. The consumer segment that chooses RTP 
contracts is relatively small, however over half of the respondents accept that their 
consumption could be controlled in so called extreme or necessary cases. 
Next, we describe the explanatory variables that are used in the regressions of this 
research. Most of the survey’s questions provide non-linear responses, hence most of 
the variables are created by dummy-coding them so that the variables represent a 
distinct group of respondents.  
The independent variables were roughly divided into three categories to model the 
research problem. These categories represent respondents: socio-demographic, 
attitude and consumer behaviour aspects. Table 7 presents the definition of most 
frequently used variables. 
Table 7. Description of explanatory variables. 
Socio-demographic variables Definition Mean 
age (metric) Respondent’s age  0.564 
city (1 if yes) Respondent lives in urban area  0.597 
female (1 if yes) Respondent is female   0.432 
hhsize (metric) Number of individuals living in the household 0.238 
high educ (1 if yes) Respondent has either polytechnic or university degree 0.562 
income (metric) 
Monthly gross income of the household (from 1<2000€, 
2=2000€-3999€, 3=4000€-5999€ … 8>14 000€ 
0.336 
apartment (1 if yes) Respondent lives in apartment or loft building 0.208 
daywork (1 if yes) Respondent has “traditional” 8:00-16:00 working days 0.482 
ftworker (1 if yes) Respondent is employed fulltime  0.462 
44 
Attitude variables Definition Mean 
default (1 if yes) 
In the choice experiment, did you always choose the 
default option  
0.147 
diffcomp (1 if yes)* I feel that it is difficult to compare electricity contracts 0.574 
ener counter (1 if yes) 
I am familiar with some energy counter that enables user 
to evaluate own energy consumption   
0.202 
entrain (1 if yes) 
I have attended to training/event where the topic was 
energy efficiency 
0.141 
follow ener use (1 if yes)* 
I would be interested to follow own energy use with some 
device, if it would come without additional costs 
0.811 
int ener use (1 if yes)** 
I am interested in to receive more information on my 
energy usage 
0.840 
int spot price (1 if yes)** 
I am interested in to receive hourly information about spot 
prices of electricity 
0.79 
low consumption (1 if yes)* 
It is not possible to reduce my electricity usage, because it 
is already at low level 
0.412 
unable timing usage (1 if yes)* 
My daily rhythm does not enable me to schedule my 
electricity usage 
0.384 
volatility ok (1 if yes)* I do not mind if the size of the electricity bill varies a lot 0.164 
Consumer behaviour variables Definition Mean 
active cons (1 if yes)* I would like to have more effect on my electricity bill  0.786 
conservative cons (1 if yes)* 
I prefer to buy products and services that are used by 
others as well 
0.466 
environ cons (1 if yes)* 
When purchasing, I always pay attention on the products 
and services environmental effects 
0.508 
fr (1 if yes) Respondent has a fixed rate electricity contract 0.724 
innov cons (1 if yes)* Testing new devices is interesting 0.526 
*: The survey question is based on a 5-point Likert scale that ranges from “1” = “Strongly disagree” to “5” = 
“Strongly agree”. The answer is yes, if respondent has replied 4 or 5. 
**: The survey question is based on a 5-point Likert scale that ranges from “0”=”I can not say, “1”=”Not at all 
interested” to “4”=”Extremely interested”. The answer is yes if respondent has replied 3 or 4. 
As it can be seen from the Table 7, all but three variables are dummy-coded or binary 
yes and no questions. Only parameters age, income and hhsize were left in the metric 
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form, basically because there was no significant benefit of dummy coding them.
21
 
The first six socio-demographic variables were included in all three regressions. 
These variables covered the respondent’s age, gender, income, education level, 
household size and whether the respondent lives in a city or not. Other variables were 
used according to their fit in the model on the basis of both statistical and descriptive 
nature.  
Variables that are inspected more in-depth are default and fr. The survey included a 
choice experiment section where the respondents were asked to choose from 
different flexibility scenarios their preferred option. Ruokamo et al. (2018) state that 
the main goal of this stated preference method was to determine how individuals 
form their preferences for demand side flexibility. This was done by identifying 
which attributes are substantial for individual’s choice, how these attributes are 
ranked and what is the marginal willingness to pay for a change in particular 
attribute. There were six scenarios to choose from. Default variable is yes if the 
respondent always chose the default option without any flexibility characteristics in 
the choice experiment. The share of respondents that fall into this category was 14.7 
percent. This is interesting result considering the bounded rationality and previous 
studies in default effects that was discussed in chapter 4.1. Also, it should be 
mentioned that since the variable default consists somewhat similar information as 
dependent variables, endogeneity is a likely problem. 
Other highlighted variable fr is drawn from the same question as dependent variable 
DNK. The respondents were asked if they have fixed rate electricity contracts. 
Variable fr represents the one’s that answered yes to that question, whereas DNK 
represents the ones that answered I do not know for the same question. It is likely 
that most of the respondents who did not know their contract type actually have fixed 
rate contracts rather than RTP or other type of dynamic contract, due to general lack 
of interest toward their own electricity contracts.  
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 For instance, INCOME was dummy coded to low income (respondents that were part of groups 1, 2 
and 3) however, there were no significant results in the results, hence the variable was left in the 
current form. 
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6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents the results and has discussion on the research outcomes. The 
chapter is divided into three subchapters, one for each regression. The estimations 
were conducted with R, which is open source-based program and environment for 
statistical computing and graphics (r-project, 2019). The regressions utilize the 
generalized linear model (GLM) function. All three regressions were done by using 
binary logit (BL) model. Over thirty different explanatory variables were fitted into 
these models, however the best fit was achieved with fewer variables in each of the 
models. 
Each model’s fit is evaluated with log likelihood, null loglikelihood, McFadden 
Pseudo R
2
 and Akaike information criterion (AIC). The coefficient results shown in 
all the following chapters are presented in estimated means of the slope. These 
coefficients provide information whether an explanatory variable has positive or 
negative effect on the probability to choose the dependent variable. The magnitudes 
of these coefficients also provide signals about how significant the effects are. 
6.1 Determinants of not knowing contract type 
The first regression concentrates on studying what factors are common for people 
who do not know the type of their electricity contract. Knowledge and awareness 
appear to be important for the acceptance of different demand response programs. 
For instance, Dütschke and Paetz (2013) found that consumers were more open to 
accept dynamic pricing programs, when they were given a chance to experience in 
practice how these can be managed in everyday life.  
The results of the first BL model are presented in Table 8. To interpret the results 
correctly it should be underlined that the positive coefficients signal that the variable 
increases the probability that a respondent is unaware of her contract type and 
negative coefficients indicate the opposite. 
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Table 8. Results of the first binary logit model. 
Dependent variable: Respondent does not know her electricity contract type 
Variable Estimate Standard error 
age  -0.0811*** 0.0186 
city 0.6851* 0.4082 
female 1.1258*** 0.4122 
hhsize -0.3630* 0.2043 
high educ -0.4868 0.4281 
income  0.0345 0.1281 
ft worker -0.4931 0.4906 
default -1.8470*** 0.6720 
ener counter -1.9114** 0.7982 
entrain 0.1432 0.6180 
int ener use -0.8778* 0.4769 
int spot price 1.4954** 0.7230 
active cons -0.3535 0.4438 
conservative cons -0.6907* 0.4059 
innovative cons -0.6858* 0.4059 
willdr -1.3140*** 0.4311 
Model fit  Fit statistics 
LL  -98.09 
LL(0)  -133.9 
McFadden Pseudo R
2 
 0.27 
AIC  230.18 
N  380 
k (# of parameters)  16 
***, **, * = statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
The results of this regression provide three statistically significant variables that 
indicate positive correlation with the dependent variable. Out of these three variables, 
the first two represent socio-demographic features of the respondents. These two 
variables are city (0.685*) and female (1.126***). Living in an urban area increases 
the probability of not knowing the contract type. The latter outcome is in line with 
the previous researches on electricity issues in Nordic countries. Higher probability 
48 
of not knowing the contract type among females can be arguably explained through 
the observation that females are generally less interested in electricity issues than 
men. This phenomena is seen in the latest Nordic customer survey
22
, where women 
prove to be less aware of electricity issues in majority of the survey questions. 
(Nordic Energy Regulators, 2019.) Also, Ruokamo et al. (2018) noted that men tend 
to be overrepresented in the survey results of energy-related studies. This can be 
explained by increased interest in energy issues within this group.  
Interestingly, respondents who are interested in receiving hourly information about 
spot prices of electricity are more likely to not knowing their current electricity 
contract type (1.495**). This may be an anomaly in the model since only 7.9 percent 
of the respondents were interested in receiving the spot price information. 
Nonetheless, the result is interesting. Typically, one could assume that if an 
individual is willing to receive updated information about electricity prices, she 
would also be interested in her own electricity issues. 
This model had plenty of explanatory variables that proved to be statistically 
significant and resulted with negative coefficients. Starting with the socio-
demographic variables and age of the respondents. Our results indicate that as the 
respondent gets older by the year, the probability that she does not know her 
electricity contract decreases (-0.081***). The variable household size indicates that 
when the size of the household is increased by one unit, the probability of not 
knowing the contract type decreases (-0.363*). This could be explained by the fact 
that electricity bills tend to increase as the number of inhabitants in the household 
increases. Higher expenditures are likely to make electricity contracts more topical 
for households. Interestingly though, income, apartment and higher education 
variables did not provide any statistically significant results on this matter.  
As for the attitudinal variables, it comes to no surprise that respondents who show 
interest in their households’ energy issues have higher probability of knowing their 
                                                 
22
 This survey concentrated on the presence and participation of Nordic electricity customers. As well 
as their attitudes towards electricity markets. The survey included responses from Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden. 
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contract types. The parameters that measure this interest are: ener counter (-1.911**) 
and int ener use  (-0.878*). Similarly, people who are willing to allow some levels of 
consumption control (willdr -1.314***) are also more likely to know their contract 
type, as well as the respondents that always chose default option in the survey’s 
choice experiment section (-1.847***). The entrain was the only attitudinal variable 
that did not have statistical significance in the model.  
Parameters that measure consumer behaviour, excluding active consumers, provide 
results that all had statistical significances and negative values. Meaning that they all 
improve the possibility of knowing the electricity contract. Interestingly though 
conservative consumers (-0.691*), people who prefer to purchase products and 
services that are generally used by others, as well as innovative consumers (-0.690*), 
both had similar coefficient levels, as well as same statistical significance in the 
model. This is interesting result since in a way these characteristics are mirror images 
of each other. Perhaps the key takeaway is that people who tend to pay attention on 
their consuming behaviour also know what they are buying.  
6.2 Determinants of RTP contract selection 
The second regression concentrated on studying what factors are common for people 
who either already have acquired RTP electricity contract or have considered 
acquiring one. The number of respondents that have RTP contracts is 18 and the 
number of respondents that have considered the contract is 41. In this research we are 
interested in the characteristics of these respondents, since they have stated their 
interest toward this contract type. Hence, these respondents are pooled together and 
compared to the ones that have not shown interest. Together these two groups of 
respondents represent 16 percent of the survey’s respondents. The results of the 
second BL model are shown in Table 9. 
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Table 9. Results of the second binary logit model. 
Dependent variable: Respondent either have or is willing to acquire an RTP contract 
Variable Estimate Standard error 
age  -0.0434** 0.0178 
city -0.1207 0.3585 
female -0.3076 0.3512 
hhsize -0.0939 0.1600 
high educ 0.2258 0.3655 
income  -0.0401 0.1147 
apartment -1.1817* 0.6197 
ft worker -0.4304 0.4485 
diffcomp -0.2031 0.3388 
unable timing usage -0.2729 0.3553 
volatility ok 0.8460** 0.3866 
conservative cons -0.6932** 0.3415 
environmental cons 0.7031** 0.3410 
fr -1.8461*** 0.3694 
dnk -2.3264*** 0.6595 
Model fit  Fit statistics 
LL  -128.8 
LL(0)  -160.5 
McFadden Pseudo R
2 
 0.20 
AIC  289.6 
N  380 
k (# of parameters)  15 
***, **, * = statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
The results from this regression provided two explanatory variables that had positive 
correlation with the dependent variable and statistical significance. These two 
variables were volatility ok (0.846**) and environmental cons (0.703**). It is 
understandable that individuals who do not have problems with a possibility of 
having a lot of volatility in their electricity bills are also more likely to acquire RTP 
contracts. After all, varying electricity prices are essential part of RTP contracts.  
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Perhaps the most interesting result is the indication that individuals who always pay 
attention on the environmental effects of products and services are more likely to 
acquire RTP contracts. This supports the general claim
23
 that RTP contracts are seen 
as a factor that not only increase market effectiveness, but also boost environmental 
friendliness of the markets. However, it should be noted that even academics do not 
consider RTP as a shortcut or automation for environmental friendliness. For 
instance, Huuki et al. (2014) highlight that the original structure of the production 
system determines the final effects on environment. If the generation mix of 
electricity relies on generation methods that are powered by fossil fuels, the high 
level of adoption of RTP contracts may even increase the amount of greenhouse 
gases
24
. Still, this result signals positive correlation between environmental 
awareness and RTP electricity contracts.   
The explanatory variables that provided statistically significant results and negative 
coefficients presented issues that can be speculated in various ways. First, it is 
understandable that respondents who showed moderate lack of interest toward 
electricity issues also had negative coefficients. For instance, respondents who did 
not know their contract type (-2.326***) and also the ones that had opted the simple 
fixed rate contract (-1.846***) both had negative coefficients. It should be 
mentioned that there is endogeneity bias, since variables fr and dnk represent features 
that are similar to dependent variable.    
Perhaps a bit more intriguing result is the negative coefficient for living in an 
apartment (-1.182%*). We can speculate that this result is linked with arguably 
lower level of electricity consumption in apartment buildings. As for the 
consumption profile of apartment residents, according to official statistics of Finland 
(OSF, 2018) space heating amounted approximately 48% of the total consumed 
electricity in a household. Apartment residents tend to have lack of ability to 
influence or time the households heating options. This is because apartment 
buildings in Finland are typically heated with district heating. Meanwhile district 
heating is an efficient heating method, it restricts the individual resident’s possibility 
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 See for instance Borenstein (2013). 
24
 In the study, researchers tested RTP adoption levels of 33.3%, 66.7% and 99.9%. 
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of timing the consumption. (Motiva, 2012.) On top of these factors apartment 
buildings typically have more or less formal codes of conducts that tend to restrict 
the use of some energy intensive and noisy household appliances during night-time. 
These rules may not be mandatory by law, but most of the people follow them to 
avoid disturbing their neighbours. All of these factors restrict the resident’s 
possibilities to acquire savings via RTP contract, because the large portion of 
consumption is harder to time to cheaper electricity hours.  
Age (-0.043**) has a negative coefficient on the matter. This result indicates that 
younger individuals are more likely to acquire RTP contracts. This is an interesting 
insight, especially for people who are keen on promoting RTP contracts. The average 
age of the respondents of this survey was 56.4 and the share of pensioners was 39%. 
The reason why this is highlighted is the fact that pensioners typically do not have to 
oblige the regular daily work schedules. This means that informed pensioners could, 
at least in theory, easily take advantage on the daily electricity price variations by 
timing some of their own electricity consumption from general peak hours, i.e. high 
pricing hours, to low demand, low cost hours. Perhaps pensioners in general should 
be more informed about the mechanics of RTP contracts. 
The result for conservative consumers (-0.693**) indicates that they are less likely to 
adopt RTP contracts. One reason for this result could be the fact that majority of 
people have not acquired these contracts, making RTP contracts unlikely choice for 
people who acquire products that are used mainly by others. We can speculate 
however, what would happen if enough of trendsetting customers switched from 
fixed rate contracts to dynamic contracts. This change could eventually make the 
RTP contracts the most popular contract type for the masses. In economics, rate of 
adoption measures the relative speed with which an innovation is adopted by 
members of social system. This rate of adoption is a numerical indicant of the 
steepness of the adoption curve for an innovation. Theoretically, once the opinion 
leaders adopt a certain innovation, the adoption curve shoots upwards in a self-
generating fashion. (Rogers, 1982.) Applying this theory of diffusion of innovations, 
we can speculate that conservative consumers would follow opinion leaders and also 
shift to RTP contracts when they do. This is interesting consideration, since this 
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parameter represents 47 percent of the total sample, which is almost the same as the 
share of Finnish households that currently have chosen the fixed rate contracts. 
6.3 Determinants of demand response contracts 
The third regression examined respondent’s willingness to acquire contracts which 
include electricity consumption control, i.e. demand response during peak demand 
periods. 54 percent of the respondents stated that they would be willing to acquire the 
contract. This is relatively high share, especially when compared with the share of 
people who are willing to acquire RTP contracts. The high number of respondents 
that accept demand response contracts signals that individuals are willing to adapt 
their consumption when needed or properly incentivised. The respondents were also 
asked: what kind of consumption control would you be willing to participate? The 
possible answers were: 
1. “Electricity consumption can be controlled automatically according to 
contracts terms”  
2. “The customer will be informed about forthcoming consumption control; the 
customer can refuse but without refusal the control will happen”  
3. “The customer will be asked if the forthcoming consumption control is okay; 
if the customer agrees the consumption control takes place, in other cases it 
will not”  
The responses were distributed almost evenly, being 37%, 25% and 38% 
respectively. It is interesting that the distribution of the answers were almost even. It 
is difficult to distinguish what makes alternatives one and three slightly more 
appealing than alternative 2. We can speculate that this could be because in 
alternative 2, the customer is forced to either silently accept or then register refusal. 
This creates psychological conundrum for the customer, either go along or refuse. 
Perhaps people prefer to feel that they are in charge, either by agreeing with contract 
terms or by having the final say in the matter.  
The results of the third BL model are shown in Table 10.  
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Table 10. Results of the third binary logit model. 
Dependent variable: Respondent is willing to acquire a contract that includes demand response 
Variable Estimate Standard error 
age  -0.0369** 0.0153 
city 0.0126 0.2899 
female -0.2669 0.2876 
hhsize -0.2624* 0.1398 
high educ 0.0013 0.3068 
income  0.0798 0.1024 
daywork -0.8235** 0.3370 
ftworker -0.2453 0.3864 
default -3.6828*** 0.6467 
diffcomp -0.4239 0.2870 
ener counter -0.8013** 0.3631 
entrain 1.2610*** 0.4467 
follow ener use 1.6359*** 0.4006 
int spot price 1.7615*** 0.6576 
conservative cons 0.5118* 0.2776 
environmental cons 0.6949** 0.2828 
innovative cons -0.4601 0.3040 
fr -0.7160* 0.4194 
dnk -2.1896*** 0.5861 
Model fit  Fit statistics 
LL  -170 
LL(0)  -238.2 
McFadden Pseudo R
2 
 0.29 
AIC  380 
N  380 
k (# of parameters)  19 
***, **, * = statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
Interestingly, almost all sociodemographic parameters proved to be statistically 
insignificant to explain the dependent variable, including high education, income and 
city. The three sociodemographic parameters that does present statistically significant 
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results are: age (-0.037**), household size (-0.262*) and daywork (-0.824**). All of 
these parameters suggest decreased probability to participate in demand response. 
These results clearly indicate that younger people are more likely to accept demand 
response. However, in broader sense willingness for demand response is not driven 
by sociodemographic characteristics.   
Other parameters that decreased the probability of acquiring demand response 
contract were energy counter (-0.801**), default (-3.683***),  fixed rate contract (-
0.716*) and dnk (-2.190***). The negative effects of fr, dnk and default are not 
surprising, since they describe people who are obviously not too interested about 
monitoring and altering their electricity consumption behaviour. Perhaps a bit 
surprising is that the parameter energy counter also decreased the probability of 
demand response. This result contradicts other results from parameters that represent 
improved knowledge about energy markets. Then again, the parameter measures 
whether or not a respondent is familiar with some counter. It does not measure the 
usage of any counter. 
The parameters that increase the probability for demand response represent mainly 
behavioural aspects of the respondents. It is surprising that conservative consumers 
(0.512*) are more likely to acquire these contracts. Then again, a narrow majority of 
the respondents are willing to acquire these contracts. Therefore, this can explain 
why people who prefer purchasing same products and services as others do, are also 
more willing to acquire these contracts.  
Similarly with RTP contracts, environmental consumers (0.695**) are more willing 
to acquire demand response contracts. Annala et al. (2018) state that the reduction of 
environmental impacts of electricity use and shift into renewable power generation 
crucially depends on demand response. The result from this regression suggests that 
people who feel strongly about environmental issues accept this notion. Annala et al. 
(2014) reviewed previous studies on acceptability of residential demand response 
programs. They stated that price and security of supply are bigger motives to change 
consumption behaviour than environmental issues. We argue that our result 
represents, if not paradigm shift, at least increased significance of environmental 
issues in the acceptance of demand response. 
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Another set of parameters that also increased the probability of demand response 
contracts were energy trained (1.261***),  follow energy use (1.636***) and interest 
in spot price (1.762***). All of these parameters represent respondents that clearly 
show interest toward energy issues; hence these results are not surprising. In general, 
these results indicate that there is a clear division between people’s preferences 
surrounding this matter. It seems that people who are perhaps more aware of the 
consequences of their consumption behaviour and generally interested in their 
electricity issues are also more willing to provide demand response. 
Six variables did not provide any direct statistical significance in any of the 
regressions. Perhaps surprising socio-demographic variables, such as income and 
high education, were among these six variables. We argue that the result related to 
income underlines that electricity issues tend to be uninteresting topic, since the price 
of the electricity is still relatively cheap.   
If we compare the results of this thesis with previous academic research, we see that 
the general knowledge about electricity issues is needed to successfully implement 
demand response programs. Dütschke and Paetz (2013) state that consumers are 
open to dynamic pricing but prefer simple programs over complex and highly 
dynamic ones. They state that consumers are not able to grasp the individual and 
societal advantages of dynamic pricing contracts. Therefore, roll-out of dynamic 
contracts should be accompanied with convincing communication and information 
campaigns in order to make sure that the advantages of these contracts will be 
perceived.  
Previous studies also show that consumers seem to favour simple price structures 
that remain in a constant level for a long period over more dynamic options (see e.g. 
Annala et al., 2014; Dütschke & Paetz, 2013). Annala et al. (2013) state that about 60 
to 70 percent of residential customers in Finland acquire electricity from their local 
supplier under a default contract. These contracts are seldom the cheapest available 
in the markets even though people state that price and saving money are the most 
important attributes in electricity contracts (Nordic energy regulators, 2019; Kaenzig 
et al., 2013). Therefore, we argue that residential consumers in electricity market are 
prone to constraints of default effects and bounded rationality.  
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Other academic studies have shown that choosing RTP or dynamically priced 
contracts will result in at least some level of consumer surplus. Allcott (2011) 
reported that price elastic households in the US that have RTP contracts can save two 
percent annually in electricity costs compared to “normal” fixed rate contracts. 
Implementation of RTP contracts in Finnish markets have also been found to have 
positive welfare effects (Kopsakangas-Savolainen & Svento, 2010). Campillo, 
Dahlquist, Wallin and Vassileva (2016) have even researched the effects of RTP 
contracts without enabling consumer demand-side management. The research used 
hourly consumption data of 7-year period in Sweden. The results state that RTP 
electricity contracts offer potential of considerable economic savings even without 
consumers changing their electricity usage profile. All these studies indicate that 
consumers would be monetarily better off with RTP contracts, yet people still prefer 
fixed rate contracts.  
On these bases we argue that money seems to be a poor or at least inefficient 
motivator for residential consumers to switch to RTP contracts. Moreover, the results 
of this thesis indicate that consumer acceptance of demand response programs could 
be better achieved by highlighting environmental aspects. Appealing to 
environmental aspects is not a new idea. Kaenzig et al. (2013) found out that in 2009 
German electricity customers were willing to pay 16% premium for electricity that is 
produced with renewable energy sources. This result indicated that the German 
default electricity mix did not correspond to customer preferences. In other words, 
German customers would have been willing to pay extra for more sustainable option. 
The survey that was used in this thesis was conducted in late 2016. It showed that 
people who consider environmental issues important when consuming are also more 
willing to acquire demand response contracts. Since then the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has released a report about global warming and 
climate change that is drastically accelerated due to man-made activities. A prime 
example of this is the greenhouse gas emissions that is released in the atmosphere 
when electricity is generated with fossil fuels. This report has been one of the main 
catalyst that has accelerated people’s willingness to act more sustainable and 
reconsider their daily choices. (IPCC, 2018.)  
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Currently “eco-anxiety” is a term that describe people reacting emotionally and 
mentally to environmental conditions and knowledge about them. Often this anxiety 
and sorrow is exacerbated due to the feeling of being powerless to influence one’s 
own future. (Pihkala, 2018). Hence, there is a need to educate consumers on their 
possibilities to have an effect on environment through their electricity usage profiles. 
Based on these issues we claim that environmental factors could better motivate 
people to adopt RTP and demand response rather than monetary factors.  
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7 CONCLUSION 
Electricity markets with rigid demand side is prone to operate inefficiently. With this 
setting the market can face significant demand peaks that require matching supply 
capacity
25
. Rigid demand side is also problematic when the supply side is becoming 
more and more dependable on renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar 
power. These energy generation methods are difficult to predict without 
uncertainties. Hence, the power system could be needing some level of demand 
response to balance these uncertainties.  
In Finland industry and commercial customers take roughly half of the nation’s total 
energy consumption. This leaves the other half of the total energy consumption to 
Finnish services, public consumption and to housing and agriculture. The focus of 
this study was to research the behavioural tendencies of Finnish homeowners and 
their willingness and readiness to acquire electricity contracts that make residential 
consumers more active in the energy markets. The electricity usage of this segment 
represented 28 percent of the total annual consumption in year 2018. 
Homeowners in Finland have a variety of options to make when they choose the 
electricity contract for their home. Choosing electricity contract is a discrete choice 
for a household. Therefore, the empirical part of this thesis was done with discrete 
regression model. Overall there were total of three regressions. The data used was 
collected with a consumer survey that was executed in October of 2016. All three 
regressions studied different aspects of consumer behaviour in the electricity 
markets. The first studied the reasons why households do not know what type of 
electricity contracts they currently have. The second and third focused on demand 
response by studying homeowner’s willingness to become more active consumers. 
The second studied the respondent’s willingness to acquire a dynamic RTP contract 
and the third researched respondent’s attitudes toward demand response contracts.   
                                                 
25
 This combined with the fact that technology for electricity storage is still inefficient to provide 
sufficient assistance. 
60 
The results of the first regression indicate that the awareness of one’s own electricity 
contract tend to be increased among individuals who are well informed about their 
own consumption behaviour. No matter if a person is actively seeking new solutions 
for old “problems” or just satisfied with having similar things as the masses have in 
general. Factors that tend to demonstrate higher electricity consumption amounts, for 
instance bigger household size, seem to increase the interest toward electricity issues. 
Straight forward interpretation of this deduction is that as the expenditures of certain 
product or service increases the interest towards the source of said expense also 
increases. According to the sample data, not knowing one’s own electricity contract 
type is more common among females and people that live in a city. The latter finding 
may be related to the lower electricity consumption levels in the cities that may 
reduce interest towards electricity issues. The former finding may be linked with 
general lack of interest toward electricity issues among females compared to men.  
The results from the second and third regressions provide information about the 
respondents’ attitudes toward demand response. The results of the second regression 
show that people seem generally unwilling to choose RTP contracts, even though 
they could be financially better off with this contract. This can be explained by 
consumers’ general lack of understanding or awareness of the features of RTP 
contracts. These contracts reward people for acting differently than masses. Timing 
household’s energy usage for the periods of lower demand means that the price of 
the electricity tends to be cheaper. One could think that group of people, such as 
pensioners would be able to utilise this feature in their daily lives. The share of 
pensioners in the sample was around 40 percent, but age proved to be negative factor 
for the acceptance of these contracts. This indicates that with better marketing, 
electricity companies could attract more consumers to change to RTP contracts. 
Generally, the share of dynamic contracts in Finnish households have been slowly 
increasing. However, this thesis shows that the fixed rate contract is still by far the 
most favourable contract. 
The third model focuses on whether respondents are willing to adapt their 
consumption if needed. The results from the third regression suggest that there is 
pretty steep difference between people who are willing to accept some levels of 
demand response in their contract and people who are not. The respondents who are 
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older or have somewhat established daily routines seem to be less likely to 
participate in demand response. People who express general interest in electricity 
issues and their consumption behaviour are more likely to accept demand response 
contracts. It is interesting that roughly 84 percent of the respondents had not 
considered a dynamic RTP contract, a contract which basically provides monetary 
benefits when the consumption behaviour is adaptive. At the same time, almost 54 
percent state that they are willing to have demand response in their contracts. In a 
way, these two contract types can be seen as product differentiation for different 
target groups. RTP contracts represent arguably the most dynamic contract type, 
hence the share of people who consider it as a viable option is substantially low. 
Whereas the other contract maps out people who are willing to accept demand 
response, but with more moderate level of dynamism. Based on this thesis, a narrow 
majority of respondents seem to accept some levels of demand response in their 
electricity contracts. 
Generally, it was interesting that neither high education nor income provided any 
statistically significant results in any of the regressions. This indicates that the 
general lack of interest toward residential electricity issues cannot be explained 
through education or income levels. One can argue that this could be due to the 
overall well-functioning power system and relatively moderate prices of the 
electricity. 
According to many studies that were covered in this paper, RTP contracts and 
demand response programs can disrupt the fundamental problems of electricity 
market’s demand side
26
. This disruption will arguably provide benefits for both 
supply and demand side of the power market that will also benefit the environment 
substantially. This leads to so called “win-win-win” situation, where companies, 
customers and the environment are all better off.   
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 The demand side is difficult to forecast and almost completely insensitive to price fluctuations, 
while the supply side faces limiting constraints at peak times, and storing the electricity is 
prohibitively costly. 
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Previous studies in this field have concentrated mainly on the monetary benefits that 
customers can achieve with RTP contracts. Even though these studies have shown 
that residential consumers would have smaller electricity bills if they would acquire 
these contracts, most consumers still tend to choose simpler fixed rate options. Based 
on our findings we argue that raising awareness of individual and more importantly 
societal advantages is the key to achieve better demand side management of power 
markets. The results indicate that invoking on environmental aspects of these 
concepts will improve the overall acceptance substantially. Overall, we argue that 
people should be more informed about electricity matters. Knowledge about the 
impacts of one’s decisions seem to be good catalyst for people to re-evaluate their 
choices. 
As for the limitations of this research, the low response rate (9.5%) may cause some 
bias. The survey was done in late 2016, after what the general discussion around 
electricity prices and environmental issues have increased in some degree in Finland. 
Hence, the study results may not represent the views of today’s homeowners. 
Especially after the IPCC released their report on climate change, more and more 
people are becoming interested in environmental issues. The survey was exclusively  
sent to people who own their homes. This means that there may be some selection 
bias, since people who live in rented houses or apartments are excluded from the 
sample.  
Finally, the survey was done during the distribution company Caruna’s first wave of 
price increases. Since then, distribution of electricity and electricity issues in general 
have been publicly discussed by many authorities. For future researches, it would be 
interesting to study how these discussions have influenced on the awareness and 
behaviour of residential electricity consumers. Also, arguably environmental issues 
are daily topic in the lives of modern people. Therefore, as a follow up research we 
would like to conduct more in-depth study about people’s preferences for 
environmental versus monetary benefits from demand response contracts.  
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